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ARGUMENT I 
WIFE ARGUES THAT THE "COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDINGS OF 
FACT" BUT DOES NOT ENUMERATE WHICH FINDINGS AND 
DOES NOT MARSHAL THE EVIDENCE. THUS, THIS COURT 
SHOULD REFUSE TO CONSIDER THE MERITS OF THE 
ARGUMENTS AND ACCEPT THE FINDINGS AS VALID 
RESPONSE 
Husband argues that Wife, in her brief in Argument I, 
referenced that the Findings of Fact were in err, and although 
Wife referenced that the Findings would be alluded to in 
individual argument relating to alimony, attorney's fees, and 
separate property issues, that they never were. In fact, they 
were, albeit perhaps not in the fashion desired by the Husband. 
The Findings of Fact are found annexed to Wife's brief, 
in the Addendum. They are in err as they failed to (1)award 
Petitioner alimony, (2) in not finding certain property to be 
non-marital and (3) in failing to award attorney's fees. 
FINDINGS OF FACT: 
1. Alimony. Paragraph 9 states the following, with respect 
to alimony: 
(A) The Court finds that Petitioner has not 
received any testimony from any medical doctor that the 
Petitioner is disabled to the point where she cannot become 
employed and can contribute to her own earnings. 
(B) The Court finds that the Petitioner's current 
4 
receipt of disability from a private insurance carrier does not 
convince the Court that her subsequent employment would disallow 
her receipt of disability from that private insurance police 
under the laws of the State of Utah. The Court further finds 
that the Petitioner has not proved that she is unable to work. 
( C) The Court finds the Petitioner's current 
yearly income from her private insurance disability to be $17,652 
per year, wLthout consideration of any additional income she may 
derive from her dogs, the sale of puppies, or other ventures that 
she was engaged in during the marriage. 
(D) The Court finds that the Petitioner's net 
yearly net income is almost equal to the respondent's 2007 income 
of $19,321. 
(E) The Court finds that any shortfall in earnings 
as a comparison between the Respondent's earnings and 
Petitioner's earnings can clearly be compensated to Petitioner by 
her ability to become employed. 
(F) The Court specifically finds that the 
Petitioner is underemployed by at least the difference between 
the Respondent's gross monthly income and the Petitioner's gross 
monthly income. 
(G) The Court finds that the Petitioner has not 
proved a need for support nor an ability on the part of the 
Respondent to pay alimony and therefore denies the award of any 
5 
alimony to the Petitioner. 
(H) The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's and 
Respondent's average living expenses and finds those expenses to 
be reasonable for each party. 
Also, paragraph 10, in pertinent part, states: 
(B) The Court finds that the Respondent during the 
pendency of this matter was forced to acquire a second job to 
assist in the payment of the alimony that was awarded to 
Petitioner under the temporary order. 
( C) The Court finds that the Respondent does not 
have the ability to contribute support to the Petitioner in the 
form of alimony. 
(D) The Court finds that the Respondent does not 
have a need for alimony from the Petitioner nor has he proved an 
ability for Petitioner to pay him alimony. 
(E) The Court denies the award of any alimony to 
either the Petitioner or the Respondent. 
(F) The Court has reviewed the Respondent's 
average living expenses and finds those expenses to be 
reasonable. 
Findings cited above were referenced in each of the sections 
of argument in Wife's brief, although not specifically set forth 
as "marshaling". They were set forth in the Statement of Facts 
in great detail as citations to the record, i.e., "never sought 
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employment with any company or employer who would use business 
degree", T.T. at 20:1-10; "worked as supervisor of security 
guards for Davis Security", 28-30 hours per week, in 1991-1992, 
T.T. at 20-11-21, "had broker's license" T.T. at 9:11-13; 
"occupation in terms of time and income generated was owner and 
operation rental properties"; etc., on page 11 of Wife's brief, 
which refer to paragraph 9(G) and 10 ( C). Also, Page 18 of 
Wife's brief, "he had amassed an approximate gross worth of over 
one million dollars (adding the appraisals of all of the 
properties without deductions for mortgages)"(appraisals attached 
as Respondent's Trial Exhibits 1, 2, 3, 4 and 7); that "he had a 
broker's license", "worked as supervisor of security guards", 
"worked for the recreation department" and "his employment had 
been almost uniformly, throughout the marriage, that of managing 
his properties" (page 19, Brief). In addition, "..by far your 
primary operation, both in terms of your time and terms of the 
income it generated, was your occupation as an owner and operator 
of rental property? " "Yes" (page 19, Brief, also, T.T. 186:23-
25; 187:1). And, that Mrs. Soderborg was gainfully employed until 
stricken with bone cancer, that she was medically disabled, 
"determined by her insurance carrier to be permanently and 
totally disabled, correct?" Yes" (page 19, Brief, T.T. 182:9,10). 
It is clear the necessity of marshaling the evidence was 
satisfied as to the issue of alimony. 
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2. Attorney's Fees. Paragraph 13 of the Findings states: 
13. The Court finds that each party has incurred 
attorney fees and that each party should assume and pay their own 
attorney fees and costs. The Court finds that neither Petitioner 
nor Respondent has the ability to pay one another's attorney 
fees. The Court further finds that the Petitioner has an 
outstanding attorney's lien to former counsel Richard S. Nemelka 
and that said obligation should be assumed and paid by Petitioner 
and she should hold Respondent harmless therefrom. 
The marshaling of the evidence relating to attorney's fees 
began in Wife's brief with an identification of the preservation 
in the trial court portion of the brief where the issue is 
referenced at 144:22 ("Do you want and have any obligation here 
for-in your opinion, to pay those attorney fees"); 225:6 ("Have 
you been forced to incur attorney's fees in this case?"); 228:14 
("Is it a request that you be awarded a portion of your 
attorney's fees?"), 229:3 (""That's it, and an affidavit of 
attorney's fees, your Honor"); 269:14 ("Ma'am, do you know of any 
cash or savings accounts that are available by Mr. - or owned by 
Mr. Soderborg that would be able to pay for your attorney's 
fees?"); 276:10, 11, 12, 14 ("You have requested an award of 
attorney's fees in this case. Is it your request that the 
attorney's fees, and the source of the attorney's fees be some 
allocation of the property that's available in this case? In 
other words, that there be a property offset for some of your 
attorney's fees?"); 277:3 ("...and actually, your Honor, I 
suppose, technically I have to say with the exception of a 
proffer of attorney's fees, the petitioner in this case would 
8 
rest. Will the Court permit me to proffer at a subsequent 
time?"); 284:18 ("My client ought to be awarded some attorney's 
fees for this trial today, because Mr. Soderborg's position has 
frankly been unreasonable. For example, that he bought into her 
house, but she didn't ever, through all of this lash up, acquire 
any interest in his properties"); 289:22, 23, 24, 25 ("Attorney 
fees. Where is he going to find monies to pay attorney 
fees....they both have need. Neither one of them have ability to 
pay..."). 
Attorney's fees are also set forth in Wife's brief on page 
22, where it states, "The Findings of Fact relating to attorney's 
fees, cited at R. 434-455, specifically paragraph 9, is rife with 
err". 
Page 22 continues with the allusion to Wife's inability to 
be employed by being medically incapacitated as follows: "her 
doctor won't release me", "there are spots there, but we haven't 
actively done anything", "right now there is a spot in my 
shoulder", "and, then, after that she was determined by her 
disability insurance carrier to be permanently and totally 
disabled, correct?" "Yes" (T.T. at 182-7-10). 
As with the issue of the Findings relating to alimony, the 
requirement to marshal the evidence as to the issue of attorney's 
fees has been satisfied. 
3. Finding Certain Property to be Non-Marital. The balance 
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of the Findings, which include paragraphs 4 (A), (B) , 
(C),(D),(E),(F),(G), 5 (A), (B), ( C) , (D), (E) , (F) , (G) , (H) , 
(I), 6 (A), (B), (D), (E), (F) (G), (H) , (I), (J), (K) , (L) , (M) , 
(N), (0), (P), (Q), ( R), 7 (A), (B) and ( C), relate to the real 
property of the parties. 
The Findings, along with the trial exhibits by both the Wife 
and Husband, together with the argument which cites to the 
record, on pages 23 through 35, inclusive, of the Wife's brief, 
and the preservation of the trial record with the extensive 
record citations, on pages 9 and 10 also of the Wife's brief, 
amass the exhaustive marshaling of the evidence as required by 
case law. 
The record is replete with "marshaling" of the evidence to 
such a degree that, although perhaps not as a "magnificent array 
of supporting evidence" as contemplated by the West Valley City 
v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 (Ut Ct App 1991) cited 
in Kimball v. Kimball, 2009 UT App 233 at paragraph 21; 
nevertheless, it was thorough, fastidious and comprehensive and 
as such meets the standard set forth in the above cases. 
ARGUMENT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN FAILING TO AWARD 
PETITIONER ALIMONY 
RESPONSE 
The Wife responds to Husband's argument that the trial court 
did not err in failing to award petitioner alimony, as follows. 
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Husband argues that Wife raises three arguments, i.e., 1) 
the mere fact that she is on disability is sufficient proof for 
the court to conclude that she cannot sustain some type of 
employment to provide for at least some of her own financial 
need; 2) Husband was "chronically underemployed" for the entirety 
of the parties eighteen (18) year marriage, and income should be 
imputed to him on that basis, and 3) now on appeal, Wife argues 
that the court should disallow certain deductions taken by 
Husband on his tax returns, and that after adding in these 
deductions, Husband's income is really $50,000 to $52,000. 
Husband misstates Wife's arguments, and they will be 
addressed in turn. 
1. The mere fact that she is on disability is sufficient 
proof for the court to conclude that she cannot sustain some type 
of employment to provide for at least some of her own financial 
need. 
The fact is, indeed, that Wife is on disability. The 
undisputed fact is that this is not a "mere" fact but substantial 
in nature and longevity. she is on not partial disability, but 
whole disability. Even Husband, in his testimony acknowledges the 
disability, as indicated in the following exchange: 
Question: Did she remain employed at Utah Power and Light 
throughout the duration of your marriage until she was placed on 
disability in the mid 1990rs? 
Husband: Yes 
Question: And Barbara, your former wife, was diagnosed with 
Cancer in approximately march of 1996, correct? 
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Husband: Yes. 
Question: And after treatment for that cancer, she was then 
diagnosed again with cancer in her right hip in 1997, correct? 
Husband: Yes. 
Question: And as a result of the cancer diagnosis and as a 
result of the treatment for that, she was placed on disability in 
1996, true? 
Husband: Yes. 
Question: Okay, and then Barbara has not worked outside of 
the home since she was placed on disability in 1996, correct? 
Husband: Yes. 
(Trial Transcript page 7:22-25, 8:1-10;20-22). 
This is further driven home by Wife's testimony: 
Question: We've heard testimony today that you were 
diagnosed with cancer in 1996: is that correct? 
Wife: Correct. 
Question: And that the cancer recurred in - or let me ask 
you this. Did the cancer recur? 
Wife: Yes, it did. 
Question: And did it recur in the form of bone cancer? 
Wife: Sure, sure. 
Wife: When you have breast cancer, if it comes to any other 
part of your body, it's still considered breast cancer. It has 
just gone to a different part of the body. So it was breast 
cancer that went into the bones. 
Question: Okay, but it had - maybe a better way to say it, 
then, would be that it had gone into the bone? 
Wife: Metastasized into the bones. 
Question: And did you receive treatment for that 
metastasized cancer? 
Wife: Yes, I did. I was put on different medications, and I 
had radiation. 
Question: Did - over what course of - period of time did you 
have treatment for the cancer the first time it appeared? 
Wife: I was diagnosed in March or April. 
Question: Of '96? 
Wife: Of x96. At which time they found out it was a very 
aggressive cancer. At the time of surgery it was a small tumor, 
but it had already spread throughout my body; 14 out of 16 lymp 
nodes was involved in cancer, which at the time - the protocol at 
that time was to do a stem cell rescue, which is similar to a 
bone marrow transplant using my own marrow. So I had to do 
numerous tests to see where it was, and make sure that my heart 
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could handle this, and everything. 
Then at that time I was into the hospital where I had to 
stay for 30 days. What they did was they gave me four different 
chemos for four or five days, taking my blood cells down to 
absolute zero. There's a high time during that time if you were 
to get a cold or anything that you would die, because you have no 
immune system. So my white cells were down to zero. 
Then they were infused back into me where they would climb 
up. I was told at the time that we are hitting this cancer with 
everything possible, because it was such an aggressive cancer; 
and that if it were to come back in that first year, I would 
probably di€>, because we had hit it with everything that we had. 
It was - nine months later it was in my hips, my femur bones and 
my pelvic. 
Question: As a result of that course of treatment did you 
have any side effects, and did you suffer any disabilities? 
Wife: I did. Fatigue was probably the number one thing. I 
have pain still in my hip and shoulder that was radiated. The 
bones, I don't know if they - I'm not a doctor; but the bones 
have been damaged. So I have constant pain. 
Question: And now there's been some talk about you being 
able to do things, like sit up at a computer or deal with a dog 
or ... 
Wife: Right. 
Question: - that kind of thing. I mean, clearly, as you are 
sitting here now, you are not a vegetable. 
Wife: No, I'm not an invalid, I'm not a vegetable. I may 
suffer later with the pain, but I'm able to do things. 
Question: When you say you may suffer later with the pain, 
you mean sitting here in Court all day in one chair, you may pay 
a price for that later? 
Wife: E will probably have a hard time hurting tonight, 
sleeping. 
Question: Okay. Have there been times, for example, are you 
on medication? 
Wife: Yes, I am. 
Question: And have you had any side effects from the 
medications that you take? 
Wife: Yes, I have. Also from the chemos that I was given, 
it is - in all of the surveys, tests - I'm sorry, I can't think 
of the word right now, but in all that they did, there are all 
these side effects, which include recurrence of cancer, which 
includes arthritis, which now I have. There's a host of other 
problems that will happen by giving a person chemo. 
Question: Okay, and is it that host of problems and sort of 
this whole fallout from the situation that's left you with the 
disability rating and benefit that you have? 
Wife: Yes. 
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(Trial Transcript page 192:11-25, 193:1-25, 194:1-25, 195:1-
14. 
This, of course, is referenced in page 19 of Wife's brief 
but now, as rebuttal, is further fleshed out with the actual 
testimony. 
Page 19 also references Trial Transcript 182:9, 10, 
testimony of Husband, which states, 
Question: Okay, and then after that, she was determined by 
her disability insurance carrier to be permanently and totally 
disabled, correct? 
Husband: Yes 
It should be suggested that "mere", particularly in the 
light of "permanently and totally disabled" has a much more far 
reaching connotation than that it is transitory or almost an 
afterthought. 
However, the "mere" fact that she is on disability is not 
the only reason, although probably a justification in itself, for 
alimony on an 18 and one-half year marriage as will be seen 
below. 
(2) Husband is chronically underemployed. The evidence at 
trial was clear that husband "never sought employment with any 
company or employer who would use his business degree", [which 
was undisputed he secured during the marriage to Wife)", that he 
"worked as supervisor of security guards for Davis Security, 28-
30 hours per week, in 1991-1992", "he had a broker's license", 
but "even his apartments only generated between 15-20 hours per 
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week", all citations on pages 11 and top of page 12 of Wife's 
Brief. The Court can take judicial notice that 40 hours per is 
commonly considered full time employment. Fifteen to twenty 
hours per week, and even twenty eight to thirty hours per week, 
are woefully inadequate. 
Husband was not full time employed during any time of the 18 
and one-half year marriage. He secured a "second" job when 
ordered to pay alimony in the amount of $514 per month at a 
hearing during the divorce proceedings. Two obvious points 
emerge. 
First, if Husband was not full time employed then he ought 
to become full time employed, and thus has a unused potential 
financial stream from which to draw for purposes of alimony. 
This was not considered by the lower Court. At the very least, 
income should have been imputed since he was not full time 
employed. 
Second, and this is not the "law of the case" because it was 
in the way of a temporary order for alimony, but the $514 
previously ordered was provided monthly by the Husband until 
trial. 
Further, there are other considerations as to excess income. 
For example, the evidence at trial and alluded to by the 
Husband on page 12 of his Brief, Husband contributed an average 
per month of $406 to $750 to household expenses from July, 1988 
15 
to November, 1994. After November, 1994, Husband paid the 
mortgage payment in full and all utilities every month until the 
separation of the parties in April, 2006, and he was contributing 
to other household expenses as well (although Husband references 
Exhibit 6 this is in error as Respondent's Exhibit 6 is History 
of Purchase of Property and Zoning Problems at 157 South 800 
East; however, TT 87-88 is accurate and also see T.T. at 208). 
The mortgage for the Wife and the utilities, according to 
Wife's Financial Statement (Respondent's Exhibit 18), which 
totaled $1,144.66 for the mortgage and $73 for electricity, $86 
natural gas, and $41 for water, sewer and garbage, for a total of 
$1,344.66, also were not considered by the Court with respect to 
available "freed up" money from which to draw alimony. 
She receives $1,470.80 per month gross income from her 
disability insurer, which, deducting health insurance of $70.16, 
leaves a net income of $1,401.64. According to Finding of Fact 
paragraph 9(H), "The Court has reviewed the Petitioner's and 
Respondent's average living expenses and finds those expenses to 
be reasonable for each party.". Those living expenses are set 
forth in Respondent's Trial Exhibit 18, and Wife's monthly 
expenses are $3,243.66. Husband's monthly expenses, as set out 
in Respondent's Trial Exhibit 12, are $3,093.73. With expenses 
that the court has found reasonable, Wife has a substantial need 
for alimony since she has a monthly shortfall of $1,842.02 per 
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month ($3,243.66 less $1,401.64 = $1,842.02). 
Other facts lending support to an award of alimony are that 
Husband has a history of borrowing from Wife and repays what he 
borrows, from his own separate cache. He contracted with Wife to 
buy into her home on Colene Drive, for $20,000, and paid the 
amount off (T.T. 34;l-5, 14-23,35:6-21, Respondent's Trial 
Exhibit 4 shows pay-off of $5,000 on December 29, 1989 and $4,500 
on January 21, 1990 with $500 cash). Husband borrowed another 
$6,000 from Wife to purchase a Corvette, and paid this amount off 
as well, "within six months" (T.T. 278:1, but see 277:24-25, and 
278:2-8). Both are substantial amounts and indicate Husband has 
no problem paying for items he wants. 
Although the Husband has additional expenses incurred with 
his separation from Wife, he has acknowledged he uses his 
apartments for his office (T.T. 44:20-21); he can use his 
apartments for his residence, as well. At trial, Husband 
indicated that all the units are full except one (T.T. 54:5). 
Husband's expenses, then, lend themselves to being minimized so 
as to allow a reasonable alimony. 
(3). Husband has the ability to pay alimony to Wife from 
the excessive expenses claimed in operation and managing the 
properties. Husband had questionable purchases which he claimed 
as expenses, as reflected in his purchase of a ping pong table 
and treadmill, addressed in pages 182 through 187 of the Trial 
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Transcript. Further, in the profit and loss from his business, 
in the third page of Tab E of the Trial Exhibit Book (referenced 
at page 173 of the Trial Transcript, lines 12 through 25, and 
page 174, lines 1-4) in which Husband acknowledged that his gross 
receipts from his business were $49,851, yet in his summary of 
his 2005 income, his income was listed at $82,000, a $24,000 
discrepancy. In addition, in response to the trial attorney's 
inquiry that "one of the concerns that she [Wife} expressed on 
more than one occasion was that she was afraid because you were 
under-reporting your income - afraid of the legal implications of 
that, correct?" "She was nervous about it, but that's not why we 
didn't file jointly" (T.T. 174:25, 175:1-5). 
Husband has reported spurious claims as expenses and under 
reports his income (note that the under reporting was not 
categorically denied; indeed, there is no denial at all but an 
acceptance). Twenty-four Thousand Dollars in a year is Two 
Thousand Dollars a month apparently available for both alimony 
and attorney fee considerations. 
In sum, Husband is a chronically underemployed and 
essentially a dead-beat Husband as far as his financial attention 
to Wife is concerned. He did not use the college degree he 
obtained during his marriage to Wife to any marital benefit; he 
didn't utilize any of his labor for purposes of enhancing any 
property other than his own property, the entirety of which he 
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acquired during the marriage; he didn't work any real job, except 
on rare occasion, as a security guard, tennis pro, or real estate 
broker, and even this employment only resulted in a part time 
effort of 28-30 hours per week; and his attention to his 
apartment upkeep was also remarkably work free using only fifteen 
to twenty hours per week. 
On the other hand, Wife is disabled. It is curious that 
Husband makes an issue of Wife being able to work, even at doing 
occasional buys at Deseret Industries and reselling at garage 
sales, as well as selling a few dogs a year, yet no physical 
proof was provided to the Court in the way of a vocational expert 
to show Wife was capable of working, even in this limited 
capacity. The only evidence produced at trial was the testimony 
of the parties and Wife indicated she could not work, and was 
receiving a whole person disability check from an insurance 
company. In the light of current events, it is well settled 
insurance companies don't pay if the need doesn't exist. Yes, 
they have continued to pay and there was no evidence indicating 
that the disability payments would be discontinued. 
Wife has a need for alimony, Husband has the ability. This 
is a long term marriage. Husband should have been ordered to pay 
alimony and for a statutory period of the life of the marriage. 
ARGUMENT III 
THE LABOR OF A SPOUSE ON HIS OWN SEPARATE AND 
INHERITED PROPERTY DOES NOT TRANSFORM THAT 
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PROPERTY INTO JOINT PROPERTY 
RESPONSE 
Husband and Wife were married for over eighteen years. 
Husband secures separate property during the course of the 
marriage (primarily from inheritance), and devotes his full time 
efforts (which amounted to part time for anyone else, including 
his Wife who, for the first eight years of the marriage worked 
the typical forty hour week for Utah Power and Light), 
contributes some mortgage payments and utility payments for 
awhile, buys and sells classic cars (twelve during the marriage, 
mostly Corvettes) with the money he makes on managing the 
properties he has acquired (although did borrow $6,000 from Wife 
early in the marriage and paid it back within six months), and 
walks away from the marriage with the entirety of the property he 
acquired and developed through his sole efforts. He also walks 
away with one half of Wife's retirement, and didn't earn any 
retirement of his own, from which Wife could draw, because his 
entire efforts were not employment for anyone but himself on his 
properties. In the meantime, Wife contracts cancer, which was 
extremely aggressive, resulting in a thirty day stay in the 
hospital, numerous chemotherapy treatments, has recurrent pain 
which doesn't go away, and a determination by the insurance 
company of a whole person disability ("...she was determined by 
her disability insurance carrier to be permanently and totally 
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disabled, correct?", "Yes", from Husband's testimony at T.T 
182:7-10). "I have a really hard time sleeping because I'm in 
pain all the time", Wife complains (T.T. 273:16-17). Wife 
receives no alimony payments, even with the disability, because 
Wife can equalize the income from her disability with purchases 
she makes from Deseret Industries and then re-selling these at a 
garage sale, and she also has an income from selling Shelty dogs, 
which, according to trial transcripts, had a value of, for seven 
dogs, $4,500 for the time in which she was separated from 
Husband, a period of about two years. The lower Court adds that 
figure into the property distribution, despite Wife's testimony 
at trial that she doesn't make any money off these dogs (because 
of the cost in raising them ("..by the time you get the money for 
all these puppies and you turn around the buy the food, buy the 
vaccinations, everything else with these dogs, there's not much 
left over", T.T. 197:10-13). She does have a nice computer room 
in which she spends six hours a day, according to Husband who has 
not spent any time in the house two years prior to trial, nor did 
he ever spend six hours at home during the day, since he was 
"managing" his own properties. 
Husband enters the marriage with zero assets, but because of 
his inheritance, he ends up owning a number of properties. The 
properties, when acquired, were dilapidated, virtually un-
rentable and were facing numerous zoning and building violations. 
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Nonetheless Husband, because of his focus and attention on these 
properties, brought them into compliance and now the properties 
"never had so few vacancies'' (T.T. 126:5). Husband, age 54 with 
no physical disabilities (T.T. 52:25, 53:1-3) was, at a hearing 
on temporary orders, ordered to pay $514 in alimony. This was 
discontinued by the trial court. 
Is there something wrong with this picture? 
Contrary to Husband's argument in his Brief, case law does 
support Wife's position regarding separate property. 
Husband relies on the Dunn case for the proposition that 
"The general rule is that equity requires that each party retain 
the separate property he or she brought into the marriage, 
including any appreciation of the separate property". Dunn v. 
Dunn,802 P.2d 1314 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, the next 
sentence, which was included in Husband's Brief reference, is 
monumental. "Exceptions to this include whether the property has 
been commingled, whether the other party has by his or her 
efforts augmented, maintained or protected the separate property, 
and whether the distribution achieves a fair, just and equitable 
result". Id. (Italics mine). 
Is it a fair, just and equitable result when Husband, 
throughout a period exceeding eighteen years, uses his labor, 
toward the betterment of the properties he acquired "and that's 
the biggest resource that has existed in this marriage, and that 
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is an asset to which my client is entitled. His labor is the 
marital asset that's gone to improve these properties, to 
maintain th€>m, to preserve them, to improve them over time/' 
(T.T. 280:15-17). 
Courts, as in the Dunn case, have recognized that invading 
separate property is a necessary exception to the general rule, 
to achieve a fair, just and equitable result. And "even in cases 
when the inherited property has not lost its identity as such, 
the court may nevertheless award it to the non-heir spouse in 
lieu of alimony and in other extraordinary situations when equity 
so demands". Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 
1990). In Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d 1201, 1204 (Utah 1983), the 
Utah Supreme Court noted that the trial court's property 
distribution - granting the wife forty percent of the value of 
the husband's company - was within its allotted discretion, in 
part, "while it is true that the [wife] took no responsibility 
for the business, it was her assumption of the domestic burdens 
which made possible the [husband's] full-time participation in 
the business", (cited in Jensen v. Jensen, 2009 UT App. 1, 1024) . 
A spouse's separate property, particularly income-
producing property, could be considered in determining alimony or 
child support, "or utilized in other extraordinary situations 
where equity so demands". Mortensen v. Mortensen, 7 60 P.2d 304, 
(Utah 1988). Premarital property, gifts, and inheritances may be 
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viewed as separate property, and, in appropriate circumstances, 
equity will require that each party retain the separate property 
brought to the marriage. However, the rule is not invariable. 
In fashioning an equitable property division, trial courts need 
consider all of the pertinent circumstances. Burke v. Burke, 733 
P.2d 133 (Utah 1987)(cited in Bailey v. Bailey, 745 P.2d 830, 
833. ( ) ...the trial court did not abuse its discretion by 
finding all appreciation in equity while the parties lived in the 
Home to be marital property. See Schaumberg v. Schaumberq, 875 
P.2d 598, 603 (also cited in Mackey v. Mackey, 2002 UT APP 349. 
This court has also reviewed, in some depth, in the Jensen 
case previously cited, a background of separate property cases. 
Included in these are references to Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT 
App 263, which provides a summary of contribution cases, and held 
that the wife was entitled to part of her husband' s separate 
business property because, although "she was not his partner in 
the business [at issue] she was his partner in the business of 
marriage", (fn 5), Id., 1 10 n. 5; Jensen v. Jensen, 203 P. 3d 
1020, at 1025, 1 12. 
It can be concluded from the cases above that, although as a 
general rule, separate property should remain separate property, 
there are exceptions to this rule based on equitable principles. 
The following are considerations that require an application 
of equity, which are not inclusive: 
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1. The parties were married over 18 years. 
2. Wife is permanently and wholly disabled. 
3. Wife's retirement, to which she solely contributed to, 
was divided so that Husband, who had not contributed, would 
receive an equal one-half share. 
4. Although wife is permanently and wholly disabled, 
Husband is in perfect health. 
5. Husband, during the entirely of the 18 year marriage, 
essentially built his own retirement, from which Wife could not 
participate, but focusing his energies and labors on enhancing 
his separate property. 
6. Husband does not have to pay alimony, although he had 
paid alimony in the amount of $514 in accordance with a prior 
order of the Court, and made these payments consistently. 
7. Wife has a need for alimony, and has a shortfall every 
month as reflected in her trial exhibit Financial Declaration. 
8. Husband has the ability to pay alimony as indicated by 
his prior payments, and his paying, in the past, the mortgage, 
the utilities, repayment of $6,000 he borrowed from Wife, payment 
of $20,000 to buy into Wife's residence, and his under reporting 
of income and questionable expense claims. 
9. Husband has income properties from which to draw income, 
which were acquired during his marriage (although by 
inheritance); Wife has no income properties. 
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10. Wife's ability to increase her Income, by purchasing 
items d :ioseret Industrie: .--••<: - -:i,"j- - i • .- . :., 
raising Oh^iLy dogs for iesaie, is highly problematic and wr-div 
insufficient f-0 wdrr'^nf ";,s ' bindin - : 
ii 10 : <- .... an
 f idohluj equal i.-e i ; «J income • r T he pait;es. 
Based on I he preceding wife should be entitled I cha re in 
t h e . > , < ] , • /> • >pe, i \ ..j.;p^iid. 
ARGUMENT IV 
THR (J»)i(\ I'ROFERLl DENIED WIFE'S REQUEST FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
RESPONSE 
.••••, --^own, in the preceding and " :• *;< initial 
Brief, that Wife has a need for attorne. •/' •• > • • m. 
tl le abi] i ty to pay, and tha t, :i n the aqgiuydte, ' is simple 
equity for Husband to be reqiiired to p r-~ the attorne ' 
V • • "e i i icorpora tes a] ] of ti le prior arguments in 1 n LS nrief 
ana < the initial Brief. 
CONCLUSION 
The principle of equit \ in marriage is center most in the 
case dt •• - • i ii^ni . , . attorney's fees nor 
any interesi n dusnand's separate property that he spent 
years ^f f h^ marriage • : *,. ,JS 
recurring pain and is o11 tota1 disabiIi i y. He has his property 
as his retirement, which he did i:o- t,; -ilh wit . Will' had 
In-.11 letirernei it from, her sole employment, to which Husband was 
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awarded one-half. 
This court should right the ship. 
DATED this 7th day of September, 2009. 
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